DIRECTED SEARCH, COORDINATION FAILURE, AND SELLER PROFITS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF POSTED PRICING WITH SINGLE AND MULTIPLE PRICES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick
• 署名单位: Deakin University; Monash University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12020
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 873-884
• 关键词: equilibrium; DISCRIMINATION; money

摘要

We experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search. In one treatment, capacity-constrained sellers post fixed prices, which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit. In the other, firms post both single-buyer (applied when one buyer visits) and multibuyer (when multiple buyers visit) prices. We find, based on a 2 x 2 (two buyers and two sellers) market and a follow-up experiment with 3 x 2 and 2 x 3 markets, that multibuyer prices can be lower than single-buyer prices or prices in the one-price treatment. Also, allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions.