LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Immordino, Giovanni; Riboni, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Salerno; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12023
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 937-956
• 关键词: commitment; CONTRACTS

摘要

We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation, and growth. We compare a rigid legal system (the law is set before the technological innovation) and a flexible one (the law is set after observing the new technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation, and output growth at intermediate stages of technological developmentperiods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies, the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive R&D investment.