LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH REHIRING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandez-Blanco, Javier
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12021
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 885-914
• 关键词: wage-tenure contracts; unemployment-insurance; recall expectations; directed search; layoffs; duration; outcomes; job

摘要

Consistent with the empirical evidence, this article analyzes a labor market in which separations are not permanent and reactivated firms prefer to rehire former employees instead of seek new ones. Workers engage in job search due to the uncertain prospects of rehiring. If firms can commit to wages contingent on rehiring, they backload wages to provide incentives for workers to reduce their unobservable search effort. Under risk aversion and incomplete markets, if productivity at reactivation is sufficiently high, the tension between wage backloading and consumption smoothing leads to excessive search in equilibrium.