COMPETITIVE SEARCH, EFFICIENCY, AND MULTIWORKER FIRMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hawkins, William B.
• 署名单位: Yeshiva University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00731.x
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 219-251
• 关键词: wage

摘要

I study competitive search equilibrium in an environment where firms operate a decreasing-returns production technology and hire multiple workers simultaneously. Firms post wages, possibly several of them. The equilibrium can feature wage dispersion even though all firms and workers are ex ante identical. Unlike the benchmark where firms hire a single worker, hiring is constrained inefficient. Efficiency requires that firms commit to the number of hires, pay all applicants, or pay wages that depend on the number of applicants. Under wage-posting, the inefficiency is highest at intermediate levels of labor market tightness.