OPTIMAL ARBITRATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12016
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 769-785
• 关键词: final-offer arbitration; asymmetric information; eliciting information; multiple referrals; legislative rules; cheap talk; experts

摘要

We study common arbitration rules for disputes of two privately informed parties, final offer and conventional arbitration. Conventional arbitration is shown to be an optimal arbitration rule in environments with transferable utility, while final offer arbitration is optimal if utility is nontransferable and the parties' interests are not too aligned. These results explain the prevalence of both arbitration rules in practice.