ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kiyono, Kazuharu; Ishikawa, Jota
• 署名单位: Waseda University; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12028
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1057-1083
• 关键词: plant locations; TRADE; tax

摘要

This article studies environmental management policy when two fossil-fuel-consuming countries noncooperatively regulate greenhouse-gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel-price changes affects the tax-quota equivalence. We explore each country's incentive to choose a policy instrument in a two-stage policy choice game and find subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds new light on the questions of which policy instrument is more stringent and of why adopted instruments could be different among countries. In particular, our result suggests a reason why developing countries tend to employ emission taxes whereas developed countries tend to adopt quotas.