A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Groeger, Joachim R.
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12085
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1129-1154
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; procurement auctions; entry; models; identification; probabilities; estimators; CHOICE; games

摘要

This article studies repeated entry and bidding decisions in construction procurement auctions. I find evidence in the data that suggests the presence of significant cost savings from entering contracts of the same type. I estimate a dynamic auction model to measure the gains to experience for bidders. I allow for endogenous entry, synergies in entry, and unobserved auction heterogeneity. I find that a bidder can halve entry costs by focusing on specific contract types. An auctioneer can increase competition by awarding contracts of the same type in sequence. As a result, procurement costs for each contract can be lowered by 7%, a saving of $110,000.