FREE PARKING FOR ALL IN SHOPPING MALLS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hasker, Kevin; Inci, Eren
• 署名单位: Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Sabanci University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12090
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1281-1304
• 关键词: downtown parking; risk-aversion; COMPETITION; preferences; ECONOMICS; MODEL

摘要

We show why a mall provides parking for free and embed the parking costs in the prices of the goods. Essentially, charging a parking fee to risk-averse customers means penalizing them for not finding their desired good. This result holds whether the mall has monopoly power or prices competitively, if there is parking validation, and if there is a trade-off between shopping and parking spaces. It is also the attainable social optimum. The equilibrium lot size is too small, yielding a rationale for minimum parking requirements. However, parking fees may be positive and lots may be too large in urban malls.