KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ngo Van Long; Soubeyran, Antoine; Soubeyran, Raphael
• 署名单位: McGill University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12084
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1089-1128
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; moral hazard; life-cycle; investments; RENEGOTIATION; earnings; holdups; DESIGN; COSTS

摘要

In this article, we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization. We show that knowledge accumulation is delayed: The fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage, falls gradually, then rises again, before falling finally toward zero. We determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem (or the specificity of knowledge). We also discuss the form of the optimal life-cycle wage profiles, the role of the initial knowledge level, and the role of discounting.