BARGAINING FAILURES AND MERGER POLICY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12130
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1019-1041
• 关键词: endogenous mergers; MODEL; CHOICE; game

摘要

We study approval rules in a model where horizontal merger proposals arise endogenously as the outcome of negotiations among the firms in the industry. We make two main points. First, relatively inefficient merger proposals succeed with positive probability. That is, the negotiation process may result in a particular merger agreement despite the existence of an alternative one that would generate higher profits and higher consumer surplus. Second, the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is more stringent for all mergers than the optimal ex post rule.