Quality signaling through certification in developing countries

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Auriol, Emmanuelle; Schilizzi, Steven G. M.
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Western Australia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 105-121
• 关键词: Credence good; Quality signaling; certification; Developing countries; Seeds

摘要

This paper studies how signaling the credence attributes of consumer goods distorts their market equilibrium in developing countries. Costs of certification, sunk in order to achieve credibility, play a key role in producing an oligopolistic market, leading to high prices that form a barrier for consumers in the South. To lower the cost, certification is better achieved by a single independent body which can be financed either by end consumers, through a fee, or by public subsidies. The paper identifies the conditions under which each funding mechanism is most efficient, taking into account the government's budget constraint. The theoretical analysis is motivated with reference to agricultural seed certification. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.