PENSION DESIGN WITH A LARGE INFORMAL LABOR MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Joubert, Clement
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12118
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 673-694
• 关键词: panel-data analysis; Retirement behavior; health-insurance; social-security; models; Mexico; simulation; mobility

摘要

This article investigates the fiscal and welfare trade-offs involved in designing a pension system when workers can avoid contributing by working informally. Using a life-cycle model of labor supply and saving decisions, I structurally estimate preferences and earnings opportunities in the formal and informal sectors using data on Chilean households. I find limited support for formal jobs rationing. Instead, mandatory pension contributions significantly encourage informality. Policy experiments show that Chile could lower minimum pension spending by 23%while guaranteeing the same income to retireesif the minimum pension's implicit tax rate was increased to 60%.