OPTIMAL GRADING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zubrickas, Robertas
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12121
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 751-776
• 关键词: educational-standards; INFORMATION; incentives; inflation

摘要

The teacher-student relationship is modeled as an agency problem, where teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students with ability signaling. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether in ability inference the job market can or cannot observe the grading rule applied. We show that many empirical grading patterns, including grade compression and inflation, are all consistent with optimal ability screening when grading rules are unobservable. With observable grading rules, the teacher perfectly screens students' abilities, provided that certain conditions hold. We apply the model to discuss policy applications such as No Child Left Behind.