WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Australian National University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Boston University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12219
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 315-330
• 关键词: Repeated games; naked exclusion; folk theorem; integration; supergames

摘要

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191-225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383-96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive-form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.