EFFICIENT LARGE-SIZE COORDINATION VIA VOLUNTARY GROUP FORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yang, Chun-Lei; Xu, Mao-Long; Meng, Juanjuan; Tang, Fang-Fang
• 署名单位: Nanjing Audit University; Tilburg University; Peking University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12230
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 651-668
• 关键词: public-goods; weakest-link; FAILURE; games; ORGANIZATIONS; provision

摘要

Efficient coordination in large groups is a fundamental issue in economic organizations. We consider the weak-link game with the feature of economies of scale that is necessary for voluntary group growth, in a minimal setup with exit and merger options. We show that large groups with efficient outcomes prevail in most communities. Seed groups form that seem to set a norm of both maximal effort level and mutual trust that there will be no panic when seeing noisy dips. Initial doubters are eventually converted into norm abiders. A restart further speeds up the process of coordination success.