IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12223
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 439-471
• 关键词: electoral competition; policy positions; political texts; Endogenous valence; candidate location; downsian model; ELECTIONS; polarization; equilibrium; INFORMATION

摘要

We analyze a two-candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (e.g., interest-group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do not observe candidates' exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist/rightist platform (relative positions). In equilibrium, candidates' behavior tends to maximum extremism, but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates. When the tie-breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair, candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter, but when it strongly favors a certain candidate, each candidate specializes in a different extreme.