RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; Demange, Gabrielle; Kranton, Rachel
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Paris School of Economics; Duke University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12275
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 421-448
• 关键词: strategic information-transmission; COMMUNICATION

摘要

This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.