Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Enikolopov, Ruben
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; New Economic School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.10.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 199-213
• 关键词: Political institutions; field experiment; Electoral system; Direct democracy

摘要

Direct democracy is designed to better align policy outcomes with citizen preferences. To test this proposition, we randomized whether 250 villages across Afghanistan selected projects by secret-ballot referenda or by consultation meetings. We find that referenda reduce the influence of local elites over both project type and location. Consistent with previous experimental results, we also find that referenda improve villagers' perceptions of the local economy and of the quality of local governance. However, we find no systematic evidence that selecting projects via referenda increases the average impact of such projects.