MULTILATERAL TRADE BARGAINING AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bagwell, Kyle; Staiger, Robert W.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12320
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1785-1824
• 关键词: rules

摘要

Motivated by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade bargaining behavior and renegotiation rules, we construct a three-country, two-good general-equilibrium model of trade and examine multilateral tariff bargaining under the constraints of nondiscrimination and multilateral reciprocity. For a general representation of government preferences, we identify the bargaining outcomes that can be achieved using dominant strategy proposals for all countries. In our analysis, dominant strategy outcomes emerge when tariff proposals are followed by multilateral rebalancing. The resulting bargaining outcome is efficient relative to government preferences if and only if the initial tariff vector positions the initial world price at its politically optimal level.