Extended families and child well-being

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LaFave, Daniel; Thomas, Duncan
• 署名单位: Colby College; Duke University; Colby College; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.11.006
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 52-65
• 关键词: Extended families; Pareto efficiency; Collective rationality; child development

摘要

Whereas the extended family plays a central role in many models of economic behavior, particularly in developing countries, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on the extent and nature of resource sharing among non coresident family members. This is in sharp contrast with abundant evidence that the distribution of resources within households predicts household spending and savings patterns. To fill' this gap, the collective model of household decision-making is extended to the family. The model is particularly appealing in this context because it places few restrictions on preferences of individual family members who may or may not be coresident and does not specify a specific bargaining mechanism that underlies negotiations. The model yields empirical tests of whether the behavior of family members is (Pareto) efficient. Evidence is presented on the relationship between three distinct measures of health-and education-related human capital of children and the distribution of wealth among extended family members using rich longitudinal survey data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The data are ideally suited for this research because the survey follows family members when they leave the family home and detailed information about individual-specific wealth is collected. We find that child human capital outcomes are affected by wealth of non coresident family members indicating that extended families do share resources. While the special case of the model in which all members are completely altruistic is rejected, the restrictions of the efficient model are not rejected, indicating that non co-resident family members are able to co-ordinate allocation decisions in such a way as to make no family member better off without another member being worse off.