PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rong, Kang
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12301
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1187-1208
• 关键词: participation constraints; mechanisms; INFORMATION

摘要

This article studies the public good provision problem, in which the principal faces a constitutional constraint in the sense that in order for a public good provision mechanism to be implemented, it must first be approved by agents under a prespecified voting rule. I find that as long as the voting rule is not the unanimity rule, the principal can propose a mechanism such that first-best efficiency of provision of the public good is achieved. I also consider various constraints, such as prohibition of discriminatory mechanisms and the existence of vote buying, and discuss optimal voting rules in these situations.