PLATFORM PRICING IN MIXED TWO-SIDED MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gao, Ming
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12298
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1103-1129
• 关键词: multiple-good monopolist; gaussian demand; commodity; COMPETITION

摘要

When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two-sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. I develop a general model for such mixed two-sided markets and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price-cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate two-sidedness. The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.