TESTING THE THEORY OF MULTITASKING: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL FIELD EXPERIMENT IN CHINESE FACTORIES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hong, Fuhai; Hossain, Tanjim; List, John A.; Tanaka, Migiwa
• 署名单位: Lingnan University; Nanyang Technological University; University of Toronto; University of Chicago; Charles River Associates
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12278
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 511-536
• 关键词: incentive contracts; performance pay; piece rates; fixed wages; QUALITY; PRODUCTIVITY; ECONOMICS; work; care

摘要

Using a natural field experiment, we quantify the impact of one-dimensional performance-based incentives on incentivized (quantity) and nonincentivized (quality) dimensions of output for factory workers with a flat-rate or a piece-rate base salary. In particular, we observe output quality by hiring quality inspectors unbeknownst to the workers. We find that workers trade off quality for quantity, but the effect is statistically significant only for workers under a flat-rate base salary. This variation in treatment effects is consistent with a simple theoretical model that predicts that when agents are already incented at the margin, the quantity-quality trade-off resulting from performance pay is less prominent.