Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maitra, Pushkar; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Visaria, Sujata
• 署名单位: Monash University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Boston University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.03.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 306-337
• 关键词: Agricultural finance; Agent-based lending; group lending; selection; Repayment

摘要

We explore the hypothesis that traditional joint-liability microfinance programs fail to increase borrower incomes in part because they cannot screen out unproductive borrowers. In randomly selected villages in West Bengal, India, we implemented trader-agent-intermediated lending (TRAIL), in which local trader-lender agents were incentivized through repayment-based commissions to select borrowers for individual liability loans. In other randomly selected villages, we organized a group-based lending (GBL) program in which individuals formed 5-member groups and received joint liability loans. TRAIL loans increased the production of the leading cash crop by 27% and farm incomes by 22%. GBL loans had insignificant effects. We develop and test a theoretical model of borrower selection and incentives. Farmers selected by the TRAIL agents were more able than those who self-selected into the GBL scheme; this pattern of selection explains at least 30-40% of the observed difference in income impacts.