WORKER TURNOVER AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Sekyu; Fernandez-Blanco, Javier
• 署名单位: University of Bristol; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12322
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1837-1876
• 关键词: Moral hazard; job; equilibrium; search; fluctuations; EMPLOYMENT; CONTRACTS; liquidity; frictions; payments

摘要

This article studies a competitive search model of the labor market with learning about match-specific productivity in which risk-averse workers factor present and future unemployment risks in their search decisions. We examine internally efficient equilibrium allocations in which match termination occurs only if the joint value of a worker-firm pair is negative. Internal efficiency poses a trade-off between present and future risks. Public insurance provision also affects this trade-off and, hence, worker turnover and job composition. In addition to unemployment benefits, the implementation of the planner's allocation requires a negative income tax and a 0 layoff tax.