INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, MANUFACTURER-RETAILER CONTRACTS, AND TWO-SIDED ENTRY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, Tat; Murphy, Alvin; Wang, Li
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12333
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2163-2191
• 关键词: industry; MODEL; MARKETS; COMPETITION; choices

摘要

We investigate the economic determinants of contract structure and entry with transfer contracts, which specify that manufacturers directly sell their products in retail stores while retailers collect sales revenue and return a transfer to the manufacturers. Using a unique data set describing entry decisions of clothing manufacturers into a retail department store, we estimate a two-sided, asymmetric-information entry model. We compare profit estimates under transfer contracts to counterfactual profit estimates under common alternative contract formats. Results show that, when adverse selection is present, transfer contracts dominate other contract formats from the retailer's perspective; otherwise, the common alternative contract formats dominate.