RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS: IS LESS MORE?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, Kala; Lychagin, Sergey; Frisancho, Veronica
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Central European University; Inter-American Development Bank
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12276
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 449-477
• 关键词: AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; dynamic-models; ECONOMICS; turkey; RISK

摘要

Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. Limiting retaking results in all agents gaining ex ante and most gaining ex post. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: Retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.