Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hicken, Allen; Leider, Stephen; Ravanilla, Nico; Yang, Dean
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.012
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-14
• 关键词: Vote-selling; Vote-buying; temptation; self-control; COMMITMENT; ELECTIONS; political economy; Philippines

摘要

We report the results of a randomized field experiment in the Philippines on the effects of two common anti-vote selling strategies involving eliciting promises from voters. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by most respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in races with smaller vote-buying payments. The treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to promise to vote your conscience despite accepting money is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with a behavioral model in which voters are only partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation.