WORKER INVESTMENTS IN SAFETY, WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS, AND COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guardado, Jose R.; Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
• 署名单位: American Medical Association; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12347
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 133-155
• 关键词: statistical life; occupational-safety; labor-market; job risk; obesity; HEALTH; DISCRIMINATION; insurance; selection; injuries

摘要

The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWDs) assumes that firms supply and workers demand workplace safety, predicting a positive relationship between accident risk and wages. This article allows for safety provision by workers, which predicts a countervailing negative relationship between individual risk and wages: Firms pay higher wages for higher safety-related productivity. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel data and data on fatal and nonfatal accidents, our precise CWDs imply a value of a statistical injury of $45.4 thousand and a value of a statistical life of $6.3 million. In line with our model, individual risk and wages are negatively correlated.