OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Troyan, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12384
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1249-1261
• 关键词: School choice; mechanism design; allocation; boston; assignment; interim; MARKET

摘要

Although there is a rich theoretical literature extolling the virtues of the top trading cycles (TTCs) mechanism, it is rarely used in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one possible explanation is that TTC is difficult for participants to understand. This article formalizes this intuition by asking whether it is possible to implement TTC in an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) way. I identify an acyclicity condition that is both necessary and sufficient for OSP implementation of TTC. The condition is unlikely to hold in most applications, which may explain why TTC is rarely used, despite its many appealing theoretical properties.