TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Melo, Emerson; Pogorelskiy, Kirill; Shum, Matthew
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Warwick; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12344
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 53-74
• 关键词: models; BEHAVIOR; games

摘要

We develop a nonparametric test for consistency of player behavior with the quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities in any structural QRE as the gradient of a convex function; thereby, QRE-consistent choices satisfy the cyclic monotonicity inequalities. Our testing procedure utilizes recent econometric results for moment inequality models. We assess our test using lab experimental data from a series of generalized matching pennies games. We reject the QRE hypothesis in the pooled data but cannot reject individual-level quantal response behavior for over half of the subjects.