ESTIMATING THE HETEROGENEOUS WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHOICE ARCHITECTURE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ketcham, Jonathan D.; Kuminoff, Nicolai V.; Powers, Christopher A.
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12382
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1171-1208
• 关键词: medicare part d; plan choice; health-insurance; decision-making; revealed preference; adverse selection; elderly evidence; ECONOMICS; INFORMATION; inconsistencies

摘要

We develop a method that embeds signals about consumers' knowledge to evaluate prospective choice architecture policies. We analyze three proposals for U.S. Medicare prescription drug insurance markets: (i) menu restrictions, (ii) personalized information, and (iii) defaulting consumers to cheap plans. We link administrative and survey data to identify informed enrollment decisions that proxy for preferences of observationally similar misinformed consumers. Results suggest that each policy yields winners and losers, with the menu restrictions harmful to most but personalized information beneficial to most. These results are robust across signals of consumers' knowledge but differ from the benchmark that excludes such signals.