IF WE CONFESS OUR SINS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Silva, Francisco
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12390
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1389-1412
• 关键词: optimal allocation; plea; ENFORCEMENT; fairness; LAW

摘要

I consider a scenario where a social planner suspects that a crime has been committed. There are many suspects and at most one of them is guilty. I characterize the optimal mechanism for the social planner under different assumptions with respect to her commitment power. I find that the optimal mechanism is a confession inducing mechanism: Before an investigation, each agent can confess to being guilty in exchange for a reduced punishment. I find that these mechanisms do better than the traditional trial mechanism because of information externalities: When an agent credibly confesses his guilt, he reveals everyone else's innocence.