CURRENCY UNION WITH OR WITHOUT BANKING UNION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bignon, Vincent; Breton, Regis; Breu, Mariana Rojas
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of France; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12373
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 965-1003
• 关键词: fiscal-policy; monetary; credit; money; COSTS; MODEL

摘要

We build a symmetric two-country monetary model with credit to study the interplay between currency integration and credit markets integration. The currency arrangement affects credit availability through default incentives. We capture credit markets integration by the extra cost incurred to obtain credit for cross-border transactions and, with the euro area context in mind, label as banking union a situation where this cost is low. For high levels of the cross-border credit cost, currency integration may magnify default incentives, leading to more credit rationing and lower welfare. The integration of credit markets restores the optimality of the currency union.