A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aruoba, S. Boragan; Drazen, Allan; Vlaicu, Razvan
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Inter-American Development Bank
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12361
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 517-545
• 关键词: policy choices; term limits; audits

摘要

This article proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime, and better voter information about the effort of the governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5%.