PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gossner, Olivier; Kuzmics, Christoph
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Polytechnique; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Graz
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12351
发表日期：
2019
页码：
241-257
关键词：
摘要：
A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially ignorant of the payoff associated with each alternative and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option, once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives can be rationalized by a DM with strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are right.
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