AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF UNCERTAINTY IN COORDINATION GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ioannou, Christos A.; Makris, Miltiadis
• 署名单位: University of Kent
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12367
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 751-799
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; global games; indeterminacy; INFORMATION; majority; FAILURE

摘要

Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (Global games) or uncertainty about the number of actual players (Poisson games) may influence subjects' behavior. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has more influence on subjects' behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects' behavior under Poisson population-size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects' behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.