IMMUNITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Bonn; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; University College London; New York University; Harvard University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12433
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 531-564
• 关键词: parliamentary immunity; CORRUPTION; ACCOUNTABILITY; confidence; DEMOCRACY; checks; press; VOTE

摘要

Legal provisions that protect elected politicians from prosecution have been common throughout history and still exist in most democracies. We provide the first systematic measurement of immunity and study, theoretically and empirically, its relation to corruption. Theory predicts that immunity is a double-edged sword. To test whether immunity is a vice or a virtue, we quantify immunity enjoyed by heads of government, ministers, and legislators in 90 countries. Controlling for standard determinants of corruption, we find that stronger immunity is associated with greater corruption. Instrumental variable estimations using immunity at the first democratic constitution suggest the effect could be causal.