PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Tremblay, Mark J.
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; University System of Ohio; Miami University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12457
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1281-1305
• 关键词: 2-sided markets; INFORMATION

摘要

We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home, multi-home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single-home and firms multi-home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi-homing and single-homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi-homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi-homing: agents find multi-homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.