DECENTRALIZED ONE-TO-MANY BARGAINING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ko, Chiu Yu; Li, Duozhe
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12452
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1139-1172
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium; POWER

摘要

We study a one-to-many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self-enforcing.