REVEALED PREFERENCE AND ACTIVITY RULES IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, Oleg
署名单位：
University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12431
发表日期：
2020
页码：
471-502
关键词：
摘要：
Activity rules-constraints that limit bidding in future rounds based on past bids-are intended to limit strategic bidding delays in high-stakes auctions. This article provides a general treatment of activity rules. Traditional point-based rules are effective for homogeneous goods and reasonably suited for substitute goods. However, they are simultaneously too strong and too weak for general environments; they allow parking, while sometimes preventing straightforward bidding. We prove that the activity rule operationalizing the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) is essentially the unique rule that enforces the Law of Demand while enabling straightforward bidding and never producing dead ends.
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