CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Jiahua; Chung, Kim-Sau; Qiao, Xue
• 署名单位: China Europe International Business School; Hong Kong Baptist University; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12523
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1513-1535
• 关键词: Political selection; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; state capacity; incentives; FEDERALISM; performance; tournaments; promotion; CHINA; decentralization

摘要

The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.