REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 981-1020
• 关键词: Moral hazard; asymmetric information; private information; health-insurance; common agency; MODEL; equilibrium; uncertainty; COMPETITION; revelation

摘要

This article studies an insurance market on which privately informed consumers can simultaneously trade with several firms operating under a regulation that prohibits cross-subsidies between contracts. The regulated game supports a single equilibrium allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who observes neither consumers' types nor their trades with firms. Public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should thus arguably target firms' pricing strategies, leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.