OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gratton, Gabriele; Morelli, Massimo
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12547
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 549-569
• 关键词: veto players; ACCOUNTABILITY; systems

摘要

Political checks and balances are debated desiderata in the evaluation of democratic systems. We suggest a framework where the pros and cons of checks and balances are, respectively, the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of type-II errors in policy decision making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when accountability is high. In policy areas where the effects of reforms are harder to evaluate and accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing less desirable regimes.