OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mandal, Pinaki; Roy, Souvik
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12538
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 261-290
• 关键词: mechanisms; allocation

摘要

We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249-61) provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.