MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bisetti, Emilio; Tengelsen, Benjamin; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12579
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1595-1623
• 关键词: optimal law-enforcement; repeated games; performance; incentives

摘要

We reexamine the ability of teams to credibly self-impose group punishments and prevent free riding when individual inputs are unobservable. We formulate self-imposed group punishments as performance underreporting by the team. Although underreporting is not credible in a static game, we show that simple strategies can sustain underreporting in a repeated game, and that the threat of underreporting improves welfare only if team members' preferences between shirking and team output consumption are nonseparable. Our results suggest that self-assessments can replace increased managerial monitoring in remote work environments.