EFFICIENT LIABILITY IN EXPERT MARKETS*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yongmin; Li, Jianpei; Zhang, Jin
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12598
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1717-1744
• 关键词: Credence goods; medical malpractice; STRICT LIABILITY; product-safety; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; physicians; ECONOMICS

摘要

When providing professional services, an expert may misbehave by either prescribing wrong treatment for consumer's problem or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose it. We show that under a range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment based on his private information if markups for alternative treatments are close enough; however, a well-designed liability rule is essential for also motivating efficient diagnosis effort. We further demonstrate that unfettered price competition between experts may undermine the efficient role of liability, whereas either a minimum-price constraint or an obligation-to-serve requirement can restore it.