MULTI-AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hoshino, Tetsuya
署名单位：
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12546
发表日期：
2022
页码：
755-776
关键词：
摘要：
A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff-relevant state and other agents' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that for any nondegenerate prior, the principal can persuade the agents to take an action profile as a unique rationalizable outcome if that action profile satisfies a generalization of risk dominance. Moreover, this result remains true even if each of the agents is allowed to strategically choose whether to receive information from the principal or not.
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