PETTY CORRUPTION AND CITIZEN REPORTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Angelucci, Charles; Russo, Antonio
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Loughborough University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12567
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 831-848
• 关键词: Mechanism design; collusion; extortion; ENFORCEMENT; BRIBERY; policies; tax

摘要

When offering incentive schemes to low-ranking officials, a tension exists between the dual goals of enforcing regulations and preventing corruption. Recent efforts to curb abuses have inspired government interest in using new communication technologies to collect information directly from citizens. We propose a model where a corruptible official is tasked with recommending the government to grant or deny the permit an entrepreneur needs to undertake production. The government tolerates corruption when it does not communicate directly with the entrepreneur. A simple scheme whereby the entrepreneur can report her own noncompliance to the government deters corruption and improves regulatory enforcement.