How public information affects asymmetrically informed lenders: Evidence from a credit registry reform
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Choudhary, M. Ali; Jain, Anil K.
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3878
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.102407
发表日期：
2020
关键词：
摘要：
We exploit exogenous variation in firm's public information available to banks to empirically evaluate the importance of adverse selection in the credit market using a Pakistani banking reform that reduced public information. Originally, the central bank published credit information about the firm and (aggregate) credit information about the firm's group. After the reform, the central bank stopped providing the aggregate group-level information. We construct a measure for the amount of information each lender has about a firm's group using the set of firm-bank lending pairs prior to the reform. We show those banks with private information about a firm lent relatively more to that firm than other, less-informed banks following the reform. Remarkably, this reduction in lending by less informed banks is true even for banks that had a preexisting relationship with the firm, suggesting that the strength of prior relationships does not eliminate the problem of imperfect information.